Warfare is one of the most heinous things that mankind has ever invented and is rarely justified. With that said one of those justifications is when you have been or will soon be attacked. That is precisely why the commandment that Moses brought down from Sinai says Don’t Murder (which implies that some killing is justified) not Don’t Kill (which implies that none of it is).
When a country goes to war governments must explain its reasons, and define the enemy in to the country in clear precise language. It is not the time for political correctness. Bush with Iraq and Olmert with Lebanon both made the same mistake, not explaining a war and its goals to their respective citizens, Political Correctness got in the way.
The War in Iraq and the War in Lebanon are just battles in a global war against Radical Islamic Terrorists. I will say it again a global war against Radical Islamic Terrorists. That is who we are fighting. The most violent of the terror groups that Israel fights are also the most “Islamic” groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
The reason we are fighting them is they want to take over our world, our lifestyles our government. Their goal is to establish Islamic governments all across the western world our goal is to stop them. But across the states they threaten, political correctness rules the day. The Democratic Congress has removed the words “War on Terror” from all documents. The EU issued an order to their press handlers that they are not allowed to connect any terrorist acts with Islam in any way. Excuse me, but when 80 year old Sadie from Miami starts throwing exploding Mah Jong tiles at innocent civilians then we can redefine the enemy as the “Radical Old Jewish Ladies from Miami”. But till then our enemy is the perpetrators of the terror (or as the NY Times likes to call them, the militants.
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Its not just the political hacks and the news media clouding the message with PC. Even some of the coalition military leaders are acting like squids, releasing a trail of political correctness, not to confuse an enemy but to make them look like “Nice Guys.” War is not supposed to be nice.
By Diana West
June 1, 2007
“If I were a Muslim, I’d probably be a jihadist. The thing that drives these guys — a sense of adventure, wanting to be part of the moment, wanting to be in the big movement of history that’s happening now — that’s the same thing that drives me, you know?” No. I don’t know. And I sorely wish I could tell him so — “him” being David Kilcullen, senior counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus, senior commander in Iraq.
With this bizarro depiction of jihadists-as-swashbucklers, Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, an Australian Army officer “on loan” to the U.S. government, should probably have been sent back with: “And I suppose if you had been a German during a certain world war, you would have been a Nazi, eh? Who more than those Third Reich ‘guys’ wanted to be in ‘the big movement of history’? Grr. Thanks, mate, but no thanks. Go play Abu Robin al-Hood down under.”
Of course, Col. Kilcullen made his outrageous comment almost six months ago to the New Yorker’s George Packer and is still on the job. But when a key counterinsurgency advisor in Iraq identifies with jihadists, it’s not just a matter of surrealism — hallucinations — at the top. As they say at NASA when things are about to fall out of the sky: Houston, we’ve got a problem.
Why? Such remarks convey either non-comprehension or indifference to the evil nature of jihad. Or both. Such neutrality, if that’s the word for it, also marks Col. Kilcullen’s discussion of his big, formative idea: lessons drawn from what he refers to as “an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a Christian-separatist insurgency in East Timor.” In the latter case, the language is jarring for what Serge Trifkovic has described this way: “In the motivation, patterns, and perceptions of the actors on the ground — killers and victims alike — East Timor was an Islamic jihad against Christian infidels” that left as many as 200,000 East Timorese dead.
In Col. Kilcullen’s Islam-blind view of the world, such events become plain-vanilla conflicts without moral distinction, differentiated only by the advent of global media coverage — a large obstacle, he maintains, to winning counterinsurgencies. Indeed, he compares Indonesia’s role in East Timor (where Indonesia ultimately failed, he says, due to global media) with the U.S. role in Iraq. This is a weirdly shocking way to see the American struggle against varyingly jihadist factions — particularly for someone advising the U.S. military.
It’s hard to say what’s worse: ignorance of jihad, for which there’s no excuse at this advanced stage of war, or indifference to it, for which there’s never an excuse. Both attitudes deeply imbue U.S. war policy. As Col. Kilcullen would (and has) put it, “the Islamic bit is secondary.” Far more important to this Australian anthropologist are what he calls “social networks.” Mr. Packer writes: “He noted that all fifteen Saudi [September 11] hijackers had trouble with their fathers.” Oh, brother — as if half the people in the world don’t have trouble with their fathers (but don’t hijack airplanes for Allah).
The New Yorker story continues: Although “radical ideas” lead young men to become jihadists, “the reasons they convert, Kilcullen said, are more mundane and familiar: family, friends, associates.”
Sounds like our problem is a cell phone calling plan, not jihadist Islam. Little wonder Col. Kilcullen is also down on the phrase “war on terror.” That’s because, as Mr. Packer writes, the concept (elliptical as it is) “suggests an undifferentiated enemy” engaged in global jihad. Col. Kilcullen strives to “disaggregate” insurgencies by disconnecting the Islamic dots linking various terror-states and terrorists. He prefers to see jihadist movements in terms of so many local grievances. It’s as if he has taken the defunct Bush doctrine “You’re with us or you’re against us” and changed it to: “You’re really not with anyone, and certainly not anyone Islamic.”
To what end? Difficult to say, particularly when, according to the New Yorker, his example of “disaggregation” is the Indonesian province of Aceh. Here, he maintains, Western tsunami aid and resentment of outsiders prevented Aceh from “becoming,” as the article put it, “part of the global jihad” a funny sort of victory to claim in a place where, increasingly, Shariah rules.
Of course, maybe the man “disaggregates” Shariah, too, reducing it to so many differentiated social networks. Just the thing, as Col. Kilcullen might say, for family, friends and associates with that jihadist sense of adventure.