The Second Lebanese war officially ended one year ago August 14th 2006. In the year since the “cease fire” agreement Hezbollah continues to exert its power through out much of southern Lebanon. While the UNIFIL troops and the Lebanese army continues to patrol the region per resolution 1701 they do so following restrictions placed upon them by the terrorist forces.

Syria and Iran has rearmed Hezbollah–its rocket power is at least to the pre war levels (if not more) and the kidnapped solders have not been returned in fact we do not even know if thy are alive or dead. In short Hezbollah is in the same place it was Just before the war. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) has all the details:

UNIFIL side by side with Hezbollah: an armored personnel carrier passing a billboard topped by a Hezbollah flag in the village of Aita al-Shaab. The picture shows Israel’s leaders during the second Lebanon war (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz) behind bars (Ali Hashisho for Reuters, July 14, 2007).
1. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed August 12, 2006 , marked the end of the second Lebanon war and created a new situation on the ground in south Lebanon . After a year, its implementation has been equivocal :

A. On the one hand , for the first time a significant number of Lebanese army soldiers supported by an upgraded UNIFIL force deployed south of the Litani River . Hezbollah was deprived of its status as the dominant force in south Lebanon and restrictions were imposed on its freedom of action. South Lebanon is relatively calm. Hezbollah, which has been rehabilitating its military force and struggling to bring down Fuad Siniora’s government, has refrained (for the longest time since its establishment) from attacking Israel .

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B. On the other hand, Resolution 1701 has been only partially implemented, and the most essential provisions have been left unattended :

1) South Lebanon was not demilitarized and Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations remained and were not disarmed;

2) Iran and Syria continue replenishing Hezbollah’s arsenal and rehabilitating its military force;

3) The arms embargo has not been effectively enforced and weapons are steadily smuggled into Lebanon from Syria ;

4) No significant progress has been made in the issue of the abducted IDF soldiers.

2. The Resolution’s achievements can be eroded and may not preserve quiet or provide for long-term stability in Lebanon in general and south Lebanon in particular . Once Hezbollah has completed its military rehabilitation it is liable to change its terrorist policy and renew its attacks against Israel . Moreover, its terrorist policy may change according to the considerations of its sponsors, Iran and Syria , regarding internal Lebanese and/or regional affairs (for example, a political crisis in Lebanon or a regional crisis of some sort). The rehabilitation of Hezbollah’s military force again poses a rocket threat for Israel, familiar from the second Lebanon war, and perhaps even more serious .

The main points of Security Council Resolution 1701. 3. On August 12, 2006 , the Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which ended the second Lebanon war and was supposed to create a new situation on the ground in south Lebanon . The resolution went into effect on August 14, after having been approved by the governments of Israel and Lebanon . 1 4. The Resolution had two main components:

A. Regarding south Lebanon (especially the area south of the Litani River): security arrangements in south Lebanon were based on the deployment of up to 15,000 Lebanese troops concurrent with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the international boundary between the two countries (the Blue Line). The Lebanese army was supposed to enforce the authority of the Lebanese government over south Lebanon , where there was supposed to be only one source of weapons, the Lebanese government, and to rid the area of the presence and activities of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. To carry out the mission the Lebanese army was to be supported by an upgraded UNIFIL force of up to 15,000 soldiers. B. Regarding north Lebanon : the resolution called for the disarming of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups (without specifically naming them) based on previous Security Council resolutions and internal Lebanese decisions. The agreement imposed an embargo on delivering arms to Hezbollah (and other terrorist groups) and called for the Lebanese government to supervise the Lebanese border crossings (on land, at sea and in the air) with UNIFIL support (should the Lebanese government so desire). The resolution also called for the unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah.

Interim report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 The new situation in south Lebanon 5. Security Council Resolution 1701 completely changed the situation on the ground in south Lebanon from what it had been before the outbreak of the second Lebanon war. The most important change was the diminishing of Hezbollah’s stature : it lost its status as the only focus of power in south Lebanon and was forced to accept the presence and activity of unprecedentedly large Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces south of the Litani River . The Lebanese army and UNIFIL show themselves and are active on the ground, operate fairly freely, and carry out routine security activities such as patrols and roadblocks, intended to preserve quite in the region and to prevent blatant violations of the resolution.

UNIFIL side by side with Hezbollah: a Spanish UNIFIL force passing by a poster of Hassan Nasrallah decorated with Hezbollah flags in the village of Addoussiyeh in south Lebanon (Ali Hashisho for Reuters, February 8, 2007 ). Hezbollah makes a show of its flags and symbols but hides its activities and weapons from the public eye

6. After the war the Lebanese army deployed in the south an unprecedentedly large force of four brigades and 10,000 soldiers (See the map in Appendix II). Its deployment throughout south Lebanon, supported by UNIFIL, reinforced its self confidence and increased its prestige (and that of the Lebanese government) in the eyes of south Lebanese residents, who since 1970 had been controlled by terrorist organizations (first the Palestinian terrorist organizations and then Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah). 7. However, both the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army, for internal political reasons, are careful to follow the unwritten rules set down by Hezbollah and refrain from causing friction or confronting the organization . The army’s routine security activity focuses on dealing with visible weapons and avoids the networks hidden, for the most part, within Shi’ite villages and those in rural areas (including the tunnels, bunkers, shelters, and command and infantry posts). In certain instances the Lebanese army even collaborates with Hezbollah on the basis of the unwritten rules. Past examples of Hezbollah strongholds in rural areas

Concrete-covered rocket launching positions.

Rocket launcher camouflaged with vegetation.

Bunkers in rural areas have a number of openings, giving Hezbollah
the advantage of surprise in battle
8. UNIFIL upgraded its forces compared with the pre-war period. Its 13,000 soldiers in eight battalions are massively deployed in the area south of the Litani River (See map in Appendix II). UNIFIL is interested in demonstrating its effectiveness, and in leading the European battalions its activity is intense compared with the pre-war period. Its activities include monitoring and photographing Hezbollah operatives and occasionally entering Hezbollah strongholds in the rural areas. 9. However, UNIFIL’s interpretation of Resolution 1701 is partial and its actions are basically limited to providing support and guidance for the Lebanese army. It refrains from actions which might confront Hezbollah , such as entering villages where Hezbollah’s military networks are located and searching for weapons hidden in populated areas. 10. UNIFIL also maintains a certain level of coordination with Hezbollah, including occasional meetings between senior UNIFIL officers and Hezbollah commanders, to work out understandings regarding UNIFIL activity. Conspicuous in that regard was the Hezbollah-UNIFIL coordination after the attack on the Spanish soldiers (See below). Hezbollah aided UNIFIL in its investigation of the incident and according to the Lebanese media, UNIFIL requested Hezbollah’s assistance in securing its troops, and Hezbollah agreed. UNIFIL’s policies are a direct result of those of the Lebanese government and of the apprehension felt by UNIFIL and the countries which sent the troops regarding the safety of the soldiers should there be confrontations with Hezbollah. 11. The upshot is that the Lebanese army and UNIFIL do not actually enforce the security measures stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1701 for the area south of the Litani River . The area has not been demilitarized, Hezbollah still maintains its military operational presence and the Lebanese government is not the only sovereign in south Lebanon , as stipulated by the resolution. In addition, north of the Litani River , an area also largely inhabited by Shi’ites, Hezbollah enjoys much broader freedom of action, since there is no UNIFIL deployment and scattered Lebanese army forces. Rehabilitating Hezbollah’s military network in south Lebanon 12. In the year since the end of the second Lebanon war Hezbollah has rehabilitated most of its military network both north and south of the Litani River . Its activities were adapted to the new situation which emerged in south Lebanon after the deployment of UNIFIL and the south Lebanese army . That is made evident by the absence of a line of posts along the border (which existed until the war), the camouflaged weapons transports and the low visibility maintained by its operatives, with no frontal confrontations or friction with UNIFIL or the south Lebanese army.

A UNIFIL force arrives at the site of planting a Hezbollah flag
(Al-Manar TV, May 17, 2007 ).
The Hezbollah flag against the background of the Israeli town of Metulla
(Al-Manar TV, May 17, 2007).

Two Hezbollah operatives, armed and wearing uniforms, interviewed in the village of Aita al-Shaab in south Lebanon . Right: A close-up of the operative’s assault rifle (Al-Manar TV, July 15, 2007 ). The photograph is unusual because Hezbollah operatives are careful to wear civilian clothing, avoid openly carrying arms

13. Hezbollah’s its military rehabilitation activities include the following:

A. In south Lebanon , both north and south of the Litani River , in our assessment Hezbollah has rockets whose range is between 40 and 110 kilometers (25-68 miles) . South of the Litani River there are hundreds of anti-tank rockets and rocket launchers (including advanced weapons), hundreds of personal anti-aircraft missiles, dozens of anti-aircraft cannons and a large quantity of explosive devices. Most of the above are hidden in Hezbollah-supporting Shi’ite towns and villages. B. For the time being, Hezbollah does not maintain a line of posts along the border . It is currently collecting intelligence from the houses of civilians in border villages (a modus operandi revealed during the second Lebanon war).

Mobile observation posts found during the second Lebanon war in rooms in civilian residences
in the village of Meis al-Jebel south west of the Israeli settlement of Manara.

C. Hezbollah enlisted new terrorist operatives to fill its ranks and trained them (approximately 650 of its well-trained operatives died during the war). Hezbollah terrorist operatives in south Lebanon have slowly returned to regular activity. There are, in our estimation, a few thousand Hezbollah operatives south of the Litani River (of a total of more than 10,000 operatives Hezbollah can put into action in a time of crisis).

Relative quiet along the Israeli-Lebanese border 14. One important achievement of Security Council Resolution 1701 has been the relative quiet in south Lebanon since the war . In the year since it ended Hezbollah has refrained from attacking Israel , not even in the Shebaa Farms, where, it has claimed, its attacks were justified (the region was a focal point for Hezbollah activity until the second Lebanon war). In addition, the public tirades of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah against Israel are not as vicious as in the past, although threats against Israel continue. Hezbollah’s year-long abstinence (a relatively long period) from attacks is unprecedented in the organization’s 25-year history, and to a certain extent may erode its image as the militant, jihadist “shield of Lebanon .” 15. Until the second Lebanon war Hezbollah’s attack policy was intended to preserve a controlled level of tension along the Israeli-Lebanese border . That was done by scores of various types of attacks: abducting IDF soldiers, attacking IDF posts in the Shebaa Farms, launching rockets and mortar shells at targets within Israeli territory, firing small arms and rifles at IDF posts and patrols along the border, using the Palestinian terrorist organizations to carry out shooting attacks inside Israel (along the Shelomi-Metsuba road), attacking IDF forces with side charges and firing anti-aircraft weapons into the skies over Israel. 16. Hezbollah’s restraint from attacks against Israel during the past year is the result, in our assessment, of two main considerations: The first is that Hezbollah needs a period of quiet to rehabilitate its forces and replenish its arsenal without interference from Israel , UNIFIL or the Lebanese government. In our opinion, that is due to Hezbollah’s assessment that a confrontation may occur between the organization and Israel or between Syria and Israel , and it is in its vested interest to be as ready as it can for such eventualities. The second is Hezbollah’s focus on its political struggle against Fuad Sinora’s government, and it is in its interest not to get dragged into confrontations with UNIFIL and the Lebanese army which might ignite internal Lebanese criticism.

17. However, the current relative calm in south Lebanon is an achievement that can be eroded, and cannot be viewed as a fundamental, long-range change in the security situation in south Lebanon . That is because Hezbollah is liable to change its terrorist policy as soon as it finishes its rehabilitation, or there may be a change in its own considerations or those of Iran and Syria concerning internal Lebanese and/or regional affairs (for example, should it be in Iran and or Syria’s interest to heat up the Israeli-Lebanese border if there is an internal Lebanese or regional crisis).

18. During the past year there were the sporadic, fairly insignificant incidents between the IDF and the Lebanese army and between UNIFIL (the Spanish battalion) and Hezbollah. The most prominent were:

A. Isolated, fairly insignificant clashes between Hezbollah and UNIFIL forces, especially the Spanish battalion in the eastern sector :

1) Clashes in the region of the village of Shuba , December 5-6, 2006 . A large force of Spanish engineers dismantled and confiscated weapons while chasing Hezbollah operatives from the area. Following the incident, booby-trapped devices and mines were laid in the region to deter the Spanish forces from carrying out other such operations. 2) A Spanish patrol crossed to the northern side of the Litani River and photographed buildings in one of the villages on January 17, 2007 . The patrol was stopped by local residents who insisted the UNIFIL soldiers leave the site. An argument broke out and the Spanish soldiers went so far as to aim their weapons at the residents. The incident occurred in an area beyond the force’s designated area of operations.

B. Isolated clash between the Lebanese army and the IDF :

1) An IDF force discovered 4-5 side charges camouflaged as rocks in the central sector of the Israel-Lebanese border (near moshav Avivim) on February 5, 2007 . The charges had been laid near the Blue Line (the boundary between Israel and Lebanon ) north of the security fence (in certain places the security fence is south of the Blue Line because of topographical considerations). Israel claimed the charges were new (and had apparently been placed by Hezbollah). The Lebanese government and Hezbollah denied the Israeli claim. 2) Two days later, during an IDF action on the night of February 7, 2007 whose objective was to find other charges, the Lebanese army opened fire with rifles and automatic weapons on an Israeli force which crossed the security fence (but not the Blue Line in the region of Maroun al-Ras). Israeli forces returned fire, shooting an a Lebanese personnel carrier and wounding Lebanese soldiers.

The IDF detonates the charges in a controlled explosion (Photo courtesy of the IDF Spokesman)
One of the charges found at the scene (Photo courtesy of the IDF Spokesman).

Global jihad attempts to turn south Lebanon into an arena for terrorist attacks 19. With Hezbollah refraining from attacking Israel , the global jihad’s attempts to turn south Lebanon into a terrorist arena against Israel and UNIFIL were conspicuous. 20. The most blatant attack was rocket fire on June 17, 2007 . A squad of terrorists connected to the global jihad fired 107 mm rockets into Israel . They were fired from the Taybeh-Addayseh region at the town of Kiryat Shemonah . Two of them caused property damage; there were no casualties. One of them misfired and landed in Lebanon near a UNIFIL post. The Lebanese army found another rocket before it could be launched. Lebanese army attempts to detain the perpetrators failed. Hezbollah denied any involvement in the attack. In our assessment, the rockets were launched by squads linked to Fatah al-Islam, the Al-Qaeda branch in Lebanon . The attacks were carried out to draw attention to south Lebanon to ease the pressure exerted by the Lebanese army on Fatah al-Islam operatives in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, north of Tripoli . 2
UNIFIL soldiers from Indonesia examining a rocket before it could be fired
(Kamal Jaber for Reuters, June 17, 2007 ). Attack against UNIFIL carried out by unidentified elements 21. An attack against UNIFIL on June 24, 2007 , was carried out by terrorists whose affiliation is unclear. The terrorists detonated a car bomb parked at the side of the road between Marjayoun and al-Khayam as patrolling soldiers passed by. Six soldiers were killed and two wounded. Hezbollah deplored the attack, claiming it harmed Lebanon . That time as well the Lebanese army was unable to detain the perpetrators. It can be learned from an analysis of the modus operandi that such a sophisticated attack is beyond the capabilities of global jihad elements in Lebanon . That reinforces the suspicion that Hezbollah was involved in the attacks against the Spanish battalion, which was perceived as too active against the organization south of the Litani River .
The UNIFIL armored personnel carrier damaged in the attack
(Al-Safir, June 24, 2007). North Lebanon 22. During the past year Hezbollah continued rehabilitating its military forces both north and south of the Litani River without the Lebanese government’s making any effective attempt to prevent them from doing so as dictated by Security Council Resolution 1701 . The embargo on providing Hezbollah with weapons was not enforced by the Lebanese government and weapons shipments from Iran and Syria continued to arrive unhampered and uninterrupted . 23. In two instances the Lebanese army stopped vehicles transporting weapons to Hezbollah from Syria : On February 8, 2007 a truck was stopped in the Hazmiye quarter of Beirut and found to be carrying smuggled weapons; on June 6, 2007 , another truck was stopped near Baalbeq. However those were exceptional cases and not part of the Lebanese government’s overall policy .
A civilian truck used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, impounded
by the Lebanese army in the Hazmiye quarter of Beirut
(SRT News for Reuters, February 8, 2007 ). 24. During the past year Hezbollah smuggled vast quantities of weapons into Lebanon to replenish its arsenal . Special emphasis was put on rockets, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. The main smuggling route passes through Syria . From there the weapons are loaded on trucks and driven through the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon along the wide open boundary between Syria and Lebanon . From the Beqaa Valley they were transferred to Hezbollah storehouses throughout Lebanon , including south Lebanon . Weapons were also smuggled in through Turkey . That was revealed on May 25, 2007 when the Turkish army discovered a shipment of weapons on a train going from Iran to Syria .

25. Hezbollah is replenishing its rocket arsenal (which was damaged during the second Lebanon war) with massive supplies sent from Iran and Syria . On the eve of the second Lebanon war Hezbollah had more than 20,000 rockets of various ranges. 3 In our assessment, today Hezbollah is capable of firing a similar number of rockets at Israel during the war and of reaching Israeli civilian population centers from the northern border to the center of the country.

The range of rockets in Hezbollah’s arsenal
on the eve of the second Lebanon war
26. Hezbollah makes no effort to hide the rehabilitation of its military capabilities although it is carried out in direct contravention of Security Council Resolution 1701 . For example, on February 16, 2007 , Hassan Nasrallah delivered a defiant speech in which he openly admitted that his organization was rearming and secretly transporting weapons into south Lebanon . 4 Lately, on July 23, 2007 , in an interview with Al-Jazeera TV, he boasted that during the second Lebanon war there was no place in Israel , including Tel Aviv, that Hezbollah could not attack. Today as well, he said, Hezbollah’s rockets could reach every target in Israel . Hezbollah leader publicly admits the organization violates Resolution 1701

Hassan Nasrallah boasts that today Hezbollah has rockets that can reach anywhere in Israel (Al-Jazeera TV, July 23, 2007).
Hassan Nasrallah publicly admits that Hezbollah has rearmed and is smuggling arms into south Lebanon (Al-Manar TV, February 16, 2007)

Other provisions of Resolution 1701 27. Other provisions of Resolution 1701 which were not implemented:

A. Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, the two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah, have not been released, Hezbollah has released no information whatsoever about their wellbeing and the Lebanese government does nothing to secure their release. B. Regarding the Shebaa Farms , a United Nations cartographer is currently studying the issue and his conclusions (which focus on delineating the area and do not deal with the issue of sovereignty) are supposed to be published in the UN Secretary General’s Report in September 2007.

The Lebanese government avoids dealing with the core issues of Resolution 1701 28. The second Lebanon war accelerated the political struggle for Lebanon ‘s identity between the radical camp (centering around Iranian- and Syrian-supported Hezbollah) and the moderate pro-Western camp (“The March 14” camp supported by the United States , the West and the moderate Arab states). It sucked in Fuad Siniora’s Lebanese government which, struggling to survive, demonstrated remarkable steadfastness and determination but preferred not to confront Hezbollah on the issue of implementing the resolution. The international community also has not usually shown much enthusiasm for dealing with the Resolution’s core issues. 29. Beginning with the first months after the war, accusations were leveled against Hezbollah as being responsible for the deaths and destruction suffered by Lebanon during the second Lebanon war, the terrible blow inflicted on the country’s economy and the very fact of its existence as an armed force in south Lebanon . The accusations heightened Hezbollah’s awareness of the need to increase its influence in internal Lebanese politics and to weaken the influence of the opposition camp. 30. One of the outcomes was that Hezbollah focused its activity on the internal Lebanese arena in an attempt to bring down Fuad Siniora’s government. To that end, the organization employed a variety of methods (quitting the government, mass demonstrations, sit-down strikes and even a number of confrontations of limited violence). The attempts were unsuccessful, but destabilized Lebanese politics and made it difficult for the Lebanese government to deal with the core issues of Resolution 1701 . 31. Despite its laxity in dealing with Hezbollah, the Lebanese government showed itself assertive in its approach to Fatah al-Islam , Al-Qaeda’s branch in Lebanon , relying on broad internal Lebanese support. 5 The government did not hesitate, for the first time, to send large numbers of Lebanese troops into the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, a Fatah al-Islam stronghold north of Tripoli , to expel the organization from the camp. That was done by reinforcing its forces in the north, which drew attention away from the south . However, in view of the heavy losses suffered by the Lebanese army for its intervention (more than 100 of its soldiers were killed), it is not at all clear if the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to attack global jihad strongholds in other parts of Lebanon. Iranian and Syrian violations of Security Council Resolution 1701 32. The process of rehabilitating Hezbollah’s military force was carried out with massive Iranian and Syrian support, in direct contravention of Security Council Resolution 1701 . Both states are clearly interested in strengthening Hezbollah and using the organization to further their own interests in both Lebanon and the entire region. As far as both are concerned, upgraded Hezbollah military capabilities in Lebanon will enable the organization to defend itself, and will also have an offensive option against Israel when the time comes, in accordance with Iranian and Syrian interests . 33. The large rocket arsenal Iran and Syria gave Hezbollah is meant to be used, when the time comes, to exhaust Israel through continued attacks on population centers deep within the country , combined with terrorist attacks. During the past year Iran and Syria did not encourage Hezbollah to renew its attacks against Israel so that it could complete its rehabilitation unhampered and perhaps even out of the fear lest the rocket option be used prematurely (as it was in the second Lebanon war). Such Iranian and Syrian calculations may change in accordance with regional developments. Appendices Appendix I : A comparison between the main provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and their implementation as of the end of July 2007. Appendix II : Maps showing UNIFIL and Lebanese army deployment in south Lebanon . Appendix I The main provisions of Security Council Resolution 1701 and the status of their implementation

No. Provision Implementation
1 An end to the hostilities and the establishment of a permanent ceasefire along the international Israeli-Lebanese border (the Blue Line, delineated by the UN’s cartographers when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000). • The resolution marked the end of the second Lebanon war. • South Lebanon has been relatively quiet during the past year; Hezbollah has refrained from attacking Israel . • Global jihad elements have made an effort to turn south Lebanon into an area of terrorist attacks.
2 • The Lebanese government will enforce its authority and control over of all Lebanon . • The Lebanese army will deploy in south Lebanon concurrent with the IDF’s withdrawal. Also mentioned is the decision made by the Lebanese government on August 7 regarding the deployment of up to 15,000 Lebanese soldiers armed with the necessary weapons and supported by UNIFIL forces. The Lebanese has broadly deployed its forces in the south (10,000 soldiers: Brigades 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12). • Eight thousand soldiers have been deployed along the Syrian-Lebanese boundary, Brigades 1, 5 and 8 plus commando units). • The Lebanese army in the south views its role, first and foremost, as carrying out routine security measures and preserving the quiet in south Lebanon . However, it avoids dismantling Hezbollah’s military networks and does not take effective action against the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah. • The Lebanese army has shown willingness to collaborate with Hezbollah on the basis of its unwritten rules.
3 The Lebanese government will be supported by a large, upgraded UNIFIL force and will undertake broader missions. • The operative provisions of the resolution allow for up to 15,000 UNIFIL solders and broader missions. • UNIFIL’s main missions are : supervision of the end of the war, supporting the Lebanese army to deploy in the south as far as the Blue Line and to establish its authority, and to provide humanitarian support for the civilian population. • The UNIFIL force is significantly larger than it was before the war. • Currently there are 13,000 UNIFIL soldiers in south Lebanon , most of them ground forces, the rest marines. • The countries which contributed most of the forces to UNIFIL are: Italy (two infantry battalions and regional headquarters), France (two infantry battalions), Spain (an infantry battalion, an interference force and regional headquarters), Indonesia , Ghana , India , Malaysia and Nepal (one infantry battalion each). • UNIFIL, especially the European battalions, try to locate and confiscate weapons. The UNIFIL soldiers, especially the Spaniards, have become bolder in certain instances, leading to friction with Hezbollah and the local population.
4 • The scope of UNIFIL’s action has been widened and it is charged with aiding the Lebanese government ( should the so government request ) to secure its boundaries to prevent weapons from being smuggled into its territory. • UNIFIL does not aid (and was not asked to aid) the Lebanese government in securing its borders and preventing weapons from being smuggled into Lebanese territory. The international community is not enthusiastic about UNIFIL’s having been given that role.
5 Security arrangements will be determined for the region between the international boundary (the Blue Line) and the Litani River . • Only the Lebanese government and UNIFIL will operate in the above region and armed groups (i.e., Hezbollah) will be forbidden to enter; weapons will be forbidden and “assets” (i.e., posts and fortifications) will not be allowed. • The principle that only Lebanese government security forces will be armed is not maintained . Hezbollah continues to preserve and rehabilitate its military strength in south Lebanon , and to bring in weapons. • Hezbollah is rebuilding its military force in south Lebanon and the rocket threat to Israel is similar to what it was during the war. In addition, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and global jihad elements have strongholds in the refugee camps, particularly in Ayn al-Hilweh near Sidon . • On the other hand, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL deployments in south Lebanon make it difficult for Hezbollah to treat the area as its own province and it is no longer the dominant force in the region. Therefore it has been forced to change its strategy and maintain low visibility in an attempt to adapt itself to the new situation.
6 The “armed militias” in Lebanon are to be disarmed and disbanded in accordance with both Security Council Resolution 1559 and the Taif Accord (1989). • The UN Secretary General is to present his proposals to the Security Council for disarming the armed groups (mainly Hezbollah) within 30 days. • The Lebanese government has made no effort to disarm or disband “the armed militias” (i.e., the terrorist organizations) including Hezbollah, and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the refugee camps. • On the other hand, the Lebanese government has been very active against Fatah al-Islam, Al-Qaeda’s branch organization in Lebanon (for the first time, the Lebanese army operated against them in the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared, north of Tripoli ). • Hezbollah has preserved and rehabilitated its military power throughout Lebanon , and Hassan Nasrallah, the organization’s leader, has publicly stated that he has no intention of disarming and every intention of rehabilitating its military power. Neither the Lebanese army nor the UNIFIL forces have made a serious attempt to stop Hezbollah. • In recent years, especially since the end of the second Lebanon war, global jihad elements have become significantly stronger in Lebanon . The Lebanese government has taken action against Fatah al-Islam north of Tripoli but not against other terrorist stronghholds, such as those in the Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp (near Sidon ).
7 The abducted Israeli soldiers are to be unconditionally released (a provision appearing in the preamble in the context of the end of the hostilities but not a condition of the end of the fighting). • An effort is to be made to find a solution for the problem of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel , but no direct link is made between those efforts and the release of the IDF soldiers. • The IDF soldiers have not been released, no sign of life has been received and the Red Cross has not been allowed access to them. • The Lebanese government has done nothing to promote the release of the two abducted soldiers or of the Lebanese prisoners.
8 No weapons are to be transferred to Hezbollah from either Syria or Iran : A. The Lebanese government is called upon to secure its boundaries to ensure that weapons will not enter its territory without its approval. B. All other countries [a hint at Iran and Syria ] are called upon to prevent arms from being supplied by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft to Lebanon (i.e., to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations). The weapons embargo has not been enforced, and Hezbollah receives regular deliveries of all types of weapons. Iran and Syria provide Hezbollah with the weapons it needs by smuggling them across the Lebanese-Syrian border . The weapons from Iran also arrive via other channels, as was shown by the shipment confiscated in Turkey . • The Lebanese government takes no effective action to enforce the embargo and refrains from asking UNIFIL for support in preventing weapons smuggling, although according to Resolution 1701 it has the option to do so. • The Lebanese army twice impounding truckloads of weapons. In one instance, on February 8, it confiscated Katyushas which Hezbollah admitted were its property. Those were exceptional events and not part of a comprehensive policy which is strictly enforced .
9 • Regarding the Shebaa Farms , the UN Secretary General is asked to propose delineation of the international borders of Lebanon , especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, to present his proposals to the Security Council within 30 days. • The Secretary General appointed a cartographer to examine the issue. His conclusion are expected to be published in the Secretary General’s report in September 2007.
10 The Blue Line (the internationally recognized boundary between Israel and Lebanon ) is to be respected . • The Lebanese government has complained of Israeli Air Force flights over its territory in violation of Lebanon ‘s sovereignty. • Because of the buildup of Hezbollah’s military power, the unending passage of smuggled arms into Lebanon from Syria and the persistent threat of terrorism from Lebanon , Israel has made aerial photo flights over Lebanese territory.
11 The issue of the village of Ghajar The issue of the village of Ghajar remains a matter of contention, as it was before the war. An arrangement has been reached by Israel and Lebanon but has not yet received final ratification from the Lebanese government. Its main points are that the residents of Ghajar will remain Israeli citizens, Israel will retain sovereignty over the southern part of the village, and the northern part will receive special status and be the responsibility of the Lebanese army with UNIFIL support. • We doubt whether such an arrangement, even if approved, will solve the problem of the village of Ghajar . It will most probably remain a loophole for terrorist and criminal (smuggling) activities.

Appendix II UNIFIL deployment in south Lebanon

Lebanon army deployment in south Lebanon

1 For further information see our August 13, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Analysis of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to end the war and an examination of its significance (primary evaluation)”. 2For further information see the June 20 Bulletin entitled “Rockets fired on Kiryat Shmona for the first time since the second Lebanon war” . 3 For information about Hezbollah’s arsenal, see the December 13, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese civilians as human shields” . 4 For further information see the February 23, 2007 Bulletin entitled “Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly admits that his organization is rearming and secretly transporting arms to south Lebanon, in blatant violation of Security Council Resolution 1701 ” . 5 In recent years there has been a massive infiltration of global jihad elements into Lebanon . The Lebanese government has done nothing significant to stop the infiltrations.

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